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JONATHAN BONE
SOVIET CONTROLS ON THE CIRCULATION 
OF INFORMATION 
IN THE 1920s AND 1930s
IF BOLSHEVIKS in general understood that knowledge is power, Stalinists
institutionalized the adage. Historians have long recognized that Stalin and his
supporters used control over information to help them gain, exercise, and maintain
power in the USSR of the 1920s and 1930s. Surprisingly, however, there has been
little serious investigation of how this deliberate manipulation might have affected
the eras archival records. On the basis of recent work in a variety of Russian
repositories,1 therefore, I should like to offer some initial observations on the ways
information was controlled within the pre-war Soviet apparat (Party and state
apparatus).
From the apparats inception, conspiratorial Bolshevik habits (carried over from
pre-revolutionary practice) reinforced tendencies normally inherent in bureaucratic
settings such that knowledge was subjected to control. Individuals and especially
institutions in the subsequent, formative years not only routinely manipulated
information for their own proximate reasons. More and more they were required to
control it procedurally, as part of the general process of consolidating and
administering Soviet rule.
1. Since 1992, I have worked extensively in the following Russian archives: the Rossiiskii
Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI), the
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi
Arkhiv Ekonomiki (RGAE), the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv (RGVA), the
Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv Dalnego Vostoka (RGIADV), the
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Khabarovskogo Kraia (GAKhK), and the Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv
Primorskogo Kraia (GAPK). 
The research and writing of this article were supported by grants from the University of
Chicago, a Fulbright-Hays dissertation-research fellowship, a grant from the Social Science
Research Council, and by a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board
(IREX) with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States
Information Agency, and the US Department of State. None of these organizations is
responsible for the views expressed.
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Specialists in the history of the 1920s and 1930s have paid considerable
attention over the years to the increasing censorship of publicly disseminated
information. However we have given short shrift to the control of information
circulating within the apparat itself. While the Soviet Union still existed this neglect
was an honest artifact of restricted archival access. In the relatively open post-1991
era, though, it has continued for what I think have been rather different reasons.
First, although cold-war concerns have not vanished entirely, the social focus
that used to be decidedly heterodox now dominates our research. Our prior
obsessions with the top end of the Soviet system and its capacity to do harm have
yielded to broader interests in Soviet society and in the subtleties of the state-
society interface.2 Second, many post-1991 investigators (Russians in particular)
have been rather more interested in exhuming the Stalinist past than in the relatively
prosaic work of analyzing it in full forensic detail. Given that the former activity
must precede the latter, much of the bias is wholly understandable and perfectly
normal. Unfortunately, zeal in uncovering repression and other salient secrets
occasionally has exceeded attention paid to the provenance and general import of
the evidence in question.
 Controls on the circulation of information within the apparat can be divided
heuristically into three general categories: right-to-know controls, need-to-know
controls, and special handling procedures.
What I call right-to-know controls involved the consecration of various types
of material according to an elaborate, graded system of secrecy classification.
Access to these sacred texts was proportionate to standing within the state
apparatus. The lower the potential recipients sacerdotal status, the lower the
category of esoteric knowledge that was allowed. 
Need-to-know controls circumscribed the circulation of information at a
given right-to-know secrecy level. They compartmentalized knowledge that was
notionally relevant to constituent parts of the state apparatus. In particular, they
ensured that bureaucratic paper was directed to specific recipients and that these
documents contained only that information thought necessary and/or sufficient for
the purpose at hand.
Finally, special handling procedures governed the preparation, distribution,
and storage of secret materials. Note that none of these generic types of controls
were mutually exclusive. Need-to-know targeting often was applied to material
already restricted by secrecy classification, further narrowing its circulation.
My eventual intent is to work through all three of these areas systematically. I
shall confine myself here mainly to right-to-know controls and some special
handling procedures. 
2. Among the neo-revisionist graduate students and young professors doing the bulk of the new
archival research, social history (or perhaps one ought to say, socially minded history) has
attracted increasing numbers of proponents. See e.g. a number of my colleagues contributions
to this issue.
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Right-to-know controls
What was classified, and why?
It was apparent long ago that an unknown but presumably large percentage of
Stalin-era documents were classified. It also was obvious that this right-to-know
control over information served the post-Stalin Soviet present. That is, it was used
to hide anything capable of undermining the official version(s) of history. Exactly
what classification may have meant in the Stalinist past, however, has remained
nowhere near as clear. We still are relatively unaware of what information
circulated in secret order in the 1920s and 1930s and why it got the classifications it
did. Neither have we been particularly attentive to how right-to-know controls may
have affected the archiving of relevant documents. These matters in fact deserve
close attention. Not only do they concern possible source biases in individual
research projects. They also help establish the general evidential boundaries within
which we can do sovietology.
During the entire Soviet period, a general Party/non-Party distinction underlay
all right-to-know controls on information. This was so fundamental it scarcely
needed to be or was articulated. Bolshevik notions of vanguard politics dictated that
Party-generated information not intended for regurgitation to the masses circulate
only within Party circles (thus reinforcing the leaders/led distinction thought
necessary, given Russian conditions, for progress towards communism). Thus
Party membership always was a prerequisite for access to Party knowledge.3
Right-to-know controls in post-1917 Russia also included principles carried
over from pre-revolutionary practice. The most obvious of these inheritances was
the necessity of restricting the number of people potentially privy to sensitive
military information. This was particularly true regarding orders bearing first on the
continuing conduct of World War I and later on operations during the Civil War/
anti-intervention campaigns. It also applied to the workings of the Sovet Rabochei i
Krestianskoi Oborony (SRKO), the emergency cabinet that in practice constituted
much of the Bolshevik central government during the desperate early years.4 In
general, formal military rank was necessary from the beginning for access to
operational military information. Certain nominal civilians also had access to non-
operational, defense-related information.5
3. Especially in the early 1920s, this sometimes was indicated explicitly. See e.g. Tainy
natsionalnoi politiki TsK RKP. Vosproizvedeno po tekstu 1-go izdaniia: Chervertoe
soveshchanie TsK RKP s otvetstvennymi rabotnikami natsionalnykh respublik i oblastei v
Moskve 9-12 iiunia 1923 g. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: INSAN, 1992), frontispiece.
This is a facsimile reproduction of the documents original front cover, which bears the right-
to-know admonition Tolko dlia partorganizatsii.
4. SRKO was formed on 30 November 1918. In April 1920 it was reconstituted as the better-
known Sovet Truda i Oborony (STO).
5. Military/civilian distinctions were equivocal in the Soviet Union of the 1920s and 1930s
because so much was or became connected to the idea of defense. Transport workers, for
example, had mobilization duties in addition to their normal responsibilities. Wartime capacity
was embedded throughout the manufacturing sector. The medical system was set up in part to
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Another conspicuous case of right-to-know continuity involved the workings of
the Vserossiiskaia Chrezvychainaia Komissiia (VChK, Cheka) and its bureaucratic
kin. Since the main point of a secret police is secrecy, once the Bolsheviks had
decided to emulate the Tsarist state and maintain one the number of people eligible
to know what it was up to had to be kept small. There also were a number of
unexceptional administrative areas in which pre-revolutionary secrecy was partly
relaxed after October 1917 and then quickly reinstated on principle. These included
high-level governmental deliberations, state finance, judicial investigations,
foreign-policy negotiations, and so on.
With the exception of the tight lid kept on information regarding the Cheka,
there was nothing particularly sinister about most of these early right-to-know
controls. Neither were they particularly pervasive. Quite a lot of what the
Bolsheviks attempted early on they actually discussed and did fairly openly (not
infrequently, pour encourager les autres
 
). Finally, neither was there anything
strikingly systematic about them. The first post-revolutionary classification
regimes appeared more or less independently from each other. Often they borrowed
on the basis of need from Tsarist practice.
During the NEP era, the various sets of right-to-know controls that had emerged
after 1917 were amalgamated into a uniform classification system. On the Party
side of things, principles adopted circa 1920 to control access to 
 
Politbiuro
 
Tsentralnogo Komiteta Vserossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii (bolshevik)
(
 
Politbiuro
 
 TsK VKP(b), 
 
Politbiuro
 
) protocols were extended during the next few
years to cover all sensitive materials.
 
6
 
 On the state side of the 
 
apparat
 
, the
Vserossiiskii Tsentralnyi Ispolnitelnyi Komitet (VTsIK) chancellery circulated in
1924 what seems to have been a first attempt at a systematic document-
classification scheme. Whether this was Russian Republic-specific or a localized
version of an all-Union procedure is unclear. Within Russia proper, at least, it went
out over then-VTsIK chair M. I. Kalinins signature and covered the handling of
 
6. Stalin seems to have had much to do with the reforms, though it is not altogether clear that he
initiated them. In the late 1910s he was one of several people charged with organizing the
Central Committees everyday affairs. According to the Hoover Institutions web-page
introduction to the Soviet-period archival records it has been microfilming in conjunction with
Chadwyck-Healey and the State Archival Service of the Russian Federation 
 
(Rossarkhiv):
 
 on
8 November 1919 a 
 
Politbiuro
 
 minute records Stalins statement that certain information about
sessions of the Central Committee, admittedly in corrupt form, somehow reaches our enemies
(RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 37). Stalin therefore recommended the establishment of a
procedure which would allow only a few of the comrades to get to know the protocols. See
Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State: Catalog of finding aids and
documents (Hoover Institute, 1995). The URL (correct at time of writing) is http: /www-
hoover.stanford.edu/archives/front.html. Click on Introduction and scroll to the linked
pages paragraph 4.
deal with hypothetical combat casualties. Fodder, grain, meat, and other procurements were
made with one eye on the state of military stockpiles, etc. Since a good deal of the peacetime
elite metaphorically wore uniforms under its street clothes, the number of nominal civilians
potentially privy to non-operational defense information was relatively large
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paper processed by state executive committees (
 
ispolkomy
 
).
 
7
 
 Its principles
similarly formed the basis of a later, more extensive classification system.
The first truly comprehensive set of procedures for controlling information on a
right-to-know basis evidently appeared in mid-1927. Promulgated in the wake of a
document-handling brouhaha by the Chekas second-generation successor, the
Ob"edinennoe Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (OGPU), it codified,
coordinated, and expanded previous practices.
 
8
 
 It also laid down what would serve
until the 1940s as the basic classification system for both Party and state. To my
knowledge this regime has never before been published or circulated among
sovietologists. As a public service I give it here in translation:
 
Orientation list of matters of top secret (
 
sovershenno sekretno
 
), secret
(
 
sekretno)
 
, and restricted (
 
ne podlezhashchii oglasheniiu
 
) correspondence.
 
I. Matters of a military nature.
A. Top secret.
1. Supervisory orders and correspondence on preparation of the army and
of the country for mobilization;
2. Mobilization schedules and plans of all state Departments 
 
(vedomstva)
 
,
industry, individual enterprises, and institutions; information connected
to mobilization plans on the production capabilities of industry;
3. All materials and correspondence on mobilization schedules and basic
orders 
 
(osnovaniia)
 
, and on development of mobilization plans, and also
all remaining mobilization correspondence in any way revealing the
general mobilization system, its schedule and most important aspects of
deployment; 
4. Estimations and norms of mobilization reserves; correspondence
containing instructions on mobilization requirements and mobilization
attainments; 
5. Mobilization requisitions of all types and correspondence on them;
 
7.  A copy is filed in GAKhK, f. r-1228 (Predstavitelstvo Dalkraiispolkoma pri VTsIKe-
Moskva), op. 1, d. 56, ll. 68-69: 
 
Sekretno. Tsirkuliarno. (Kopiia). Vsem ispolnitelnym
komitetam avtonomnykh oblastei, vsem gubernskim i oblastnym ispolnitelnym komitetam
RSFSR. Pravila vvedeniia sekretno deloproizvodstva v obl[astiakh] i gubispolkomakh, a
takzhe vo vsekh TsIKakh avtonomnykh respublik. [from:] Pred[stavitel] VTsIK M. Kalinin,
sek[retar] VTsIK. Moskva. Kreml. 6 marta 1924.
 
8. The Cheka
 
 
 
was succeeded on 6 February 1922 by the Gosudarstvennoe Politupravlenie
(GPU), which was reconstituted on 15 November 1923 as the OGPU. This in turn was
liquidated on 10 July 1934 and melded into a reconstituted Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh
Del (NKVD). This version of the NKVD served throughout the rest of the 1930s as the
umbrella internal-affairs/police organ.
I ran across the document-handling affair while looking for something else in the
Khabarovsk archives but unfortunately failed to write down anything substantive about it. I
now find I can but dimly recall what supposedly happened. If memory serves: one of the major
Commissariats had been discovered handing over documents stamped secret to a paper
recycler; other examples had turned up where non-secret messages had been written on the
obverse of old classified documents and then circulated openly. At any rate, see GAKhK, f. r-
1228, op. 1, d. 56, probably somewhere around ll. 60-80.
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6. Formation-scheme dislocation and correspondence on the deployment
of military units and institutions of all state Departments during
mobilization;
7. The quartering schedule and correspondence on billeting troop units in
the event of war;
8. Information on the organization of assembly and delivery points with
instructions on daily capacity and the length of their operation;
9. Correspondence on the utilization during mobilization of local material
means for the necessities of troops; 
10. Correspondence on construction and repair work to the extent that it
reveals mobilization goals; 
11. Extra-estimate 
 
(sverkhsmetnye)
 
 requisitions and special-purpose State-
Department budgetary estimates for preparation of equipment that are
tied to mobilization preparation; estimates of mobilization monetary
expenses; 
12. Credits for carrying out war and budget estimates for the initial period of
a war;
13. Evacuation plans, materials on them, and correspondence on their
development;
14. Description of the work of mobilization organs, correspondence and
materials pertaining to experimental and trial mobilizations;
inspectorate-run mobilization trials; 
15. Matters of the countrys military-engineering, air, and military-chemical
preparation;
16. Chemical means of attack and defense, consisting of [existing] arms,
arms planned for introduction or desired arms (gases, anti-gases, etc.);
and means of defense from the airborne enemy; 
17. Especially important inventions and proposals; experimental requisitions
for new types of weapons from inventions having a top-secret character;
design descriptions and budget estimates for these items;
18. Operational-intelligence and informant 
 
(osvedomitelnye)
 
 summaries
and information;
19. The dislocation of troop units, of the administration, and of the
institutions of the [Workers and Peasants] Red Army and of
Departmental armed guards during wartime; the full dislocation of the
Red Army, and of military- and aviation-industry factories in peacetime;
20. The condition and production plans of military- and aviation-industry
enterprises;
21. New construction of military and aviation factories;
22. Photo-surveys and plans of fortresses, fortified areas, military ports,
explosives warehouses, military- and aviation-industry factories (both
factories in toto and production sections of factories), and of technical
construction on strategically significant lines of communication;
23. Plans of commercial transport in wartime, material related to them and
correspondence on their development;
24. The chart and timetable for the movement of trains in wartime with
explanatory notes on it; rail-junction agreements;
25. Plans for the restoration and the destruction of lines of communication
and correspondence on them;
26. Mass negative 
 
(otritsatelnye)
 
 occurrences in the political and moral
condition of troop units, characterized by their disintegration.
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B. Secret.
1. The organization of mobilization plans and regulations on them;
2. Correspondence on requisitions for military equipment from abroad;
3. Matters of extraordinary protection, connected to carrying out military
and exceptional regulations; 
4. Objectives of military protection; the condition, numerical strength, and 
armaments of the latter; the specially important state significance of
objectives of Departmental armed protection; 
5. The condition of fire protection for military-industrial factories and
warehouses of the institutionalized military 
 
(voenved
 
, for 
 
voennoe
vedomstvo)
 
;
6. Correspondence preparatory to the promulgation of measures for
curtailing civil-aviation flights or changing these flights;
7. Military-topographic maps:
a) On a scale of 1-100,000 (or 2 versts to 1 inch) and larger within the limits
of the extended border zone 
 
(prigranichnaia polosa)
 
 established by the
Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR (Revoliutsionnyi Voennyi 
Sovet (RVS SSSR)) and published after 1 January 1918;
b) On a scale of 1-200,000 (or 5 versts to 1 inch) and larger for fortress
regions, fortified areas, ports, batteries, and forts;
c) Of all scales, supplemented with newly designated symbols for special
Commissariat of Army and Naval Matters (Narodnyi Komissariat po
Voennym i Morskim Delam 
 
 Narkomvoenmor
 
) purposes;
8. Individual negative occurrences in the political and moral condition of
troop units, capable of leading to their disintegration;
9. a) The dislocation in toto of all units, administration, and institutions of
each military region;
b) The dislocation in toto of every individual type of force (rifle,
command, artillery, technical units of all specialties, the air force, the
fleet); 
c) The dislocation in toto of every category of institution and
establishment (for example, [the sites of] all institutions of higher
learning 
 
(VUZy),
 
 all warehouses, etc.);
d) The concise dislocation of the Red Army;
10. The dislocation of military and aviation factories individually;
11. General plans for procurement, construction, and major-repair work for
the requirements of the armed forces and information on the supply of the
latter in all categories of supply and allowance 
 
(dovolstvie)
 
 in peacetime;
12. Correspondence on current orders of the institutionalized military to
industry in the event they disclose instructions on the scale and
fulfillment level of the order/program task for individual industrial
sectors;
13. Matters of military shipbuilding and ship repair;
14. Information on equipping military and aviation factories with
apparatuses and crucial equipment, giving the possibility of drawing
conclusions about factory capacity;
15. The organization and staff of units, institutions, and establishments of
the Red Army in wartime;
16. Correspondence on the drafting of Soviet citizens residing abroad;
17. The organization and equipment of concentration and delivery points;
18. Mobilization correspondence with the exception of matters designated
as top-secret in [I-A,] point 3;
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19. The allocation of land under military installations (fortresses, hangars,
proving grounds, etc.) to the institutionalized military; and the making of
structures and the planting of trees called for by defense needs; 
20. Matters containing in themselves data having connection both to
mobilization readiness and to preparation of all types of transport, but
not appearing as elements in the mobilization plan, in agreement with the
periodically established Commissariat of Railroads (Narodnyi
Komissariat Putei Soobshchenii  NKPS) and 
 
Narkomvoenmor
 
 lists;
21. Photo-surveys and plans of civilian 
 
(grazhdanskie)
 
 factories (or of their
production sections) in cases where the factories (or their production) are
occupied in the manufacture of Red Army armaments.
II. [Matters of] a financial-economic nature.
A. Secret.
1. The export plan in toto and the export in part of individual goods;
2. The import plan in toto and per individual purchases, if the latter point to
a percentage relationship to the general plan in toto or to the import in
part of individual goods, or else touch on the import of items which are
secret;
Note: Pertaining to this last are items having a connection to the fighting
capacity of the army, purchases of horses, items purchased for military
industry 
 
(voenprom)
 
 and the Aviation Trust;
3. Correspondence on special imports;
4. The finance plan for exports and imports in accordance with the
exposition in points 1-3 above;
5. Preparation of trade, customs, special-rights, sanitary, etc. treaties,
conventions, and agreements;
6. Unfavorable information on the quality of goods subject to export;
7. Correspondence on the fight against contraband;
8. Correspondence on preliminary negotiations on major orders abroad for
goods and important equipment;
9. Reports of organs abroad, containing in themselves indications: 1) of the
organizational forms of [their] work; 2) of the scheduled character and
scale of [their] activities;
10. Working up the basic regulations for reviewing customs tariffs and
custom-tariff rates;
11. Preparation of concession agreements;
12. Operations for buying and conversion 
 
(realizatsiia)
 
 of precious metals,
gemstones, foreign hard currency, and hard-currency supplies;
13. The state of the scheduled hard-currency supply;
14. Hard-currency resources of banks and economic organs;
15. Hard-currency plans;
16. Correspondence on Soviet banks abroad;
17. Matters of our monetary and hard-currency policies abroad;
18. Correspondence on international settlements of the USSR and on
borrowing abroad;
19. Correspondence establishing concrete operational measures for
regulating the hard-currency and commodities markets;
20. Secret budget estimates (individually secret articles of Departmental
budget estimates) of the Central Executive Committee (Tsentralnyi
Ispolnitelnyi Komitet SSSR  TsIK), The Council of Peoples
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Commissars (Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov  SNK SSSR), the
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narodnyi Komissariat Innostrannykh
Del  
 
Narkomindel
 
), the OGPU, 
 
Narkomvoenmor
 
,  and others; secret
extra-budget requests; bookkeeping re these;
21. Minting coins and preparing paper money per special orders constituting
state secrets;
22. Counterfeit money and the struggle against counterfeiters;
23. Correspondence establishing rates proposed for the issue of government
bonds, and proposed prices for the realization of bonds and quotation
plans;
24. Correspondence on enterprises and property located abroad in which the
USSR has a state interest;
25. Manufacture, production, and inventory of platinum and of rare
chemical elements, such as radium, vanadium, helium, etc.;
26. Inventions and improvements having state significance;
27. Correspondence on the subscription of specialists from abroad in cases
where they are being invited for work bearing a secret character;
28. Correspondence concerning the impossibility of fulfillment by [those]
economic organs having Union-level significance and the right to
participate in foreign markets of their foreign obligations (in connection
with foreign banks and firms).
B. Restricted.
1. Materials on the preparation of export and import plans;
2. Preparation for the foundation of joint-stock companies bringing in
foreign capital;
3. Inquiries and information on credit worthiness;
4. The imposition of prohibitions on capital; the unacceptability of various
banks bills of acceptance; 
5. The establishment of budgetary limits and limit policies;
6. Plans for the supply of the domestic market;
7. New deposits of platinum and rare metals;
8. Calculation 
 
(kalkulatsiia)
 
 of export goods;
9. Correspondence containing information on unfavorable occurrences in
hard-currency and commodities markets.
III. [Material of] a political nature. 
A. In agreement with special regulations 
 
(soglasno osobykh polozhenii)
 
.
Correspondence of Party organs and other conspiratorial 
 
(konspirativnye)
 
documents.
B. Top secret.
1. Information summaries 
 
(svodki)
 
 and surveys 
 
(obzory) 
 
of the OGPU and
other surveillance organs;
2. Information and materials on the activities of anti-Soviet parties and
groupings, and on the struggle with them;
3. Correspondence on matters of political and economic espionage, and
also on methods and measures of the struggle with counter-revolution
and espionage;
4. Secret agreements with foreign governments and correspondence on
their conclusion;
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5. Reports and individual information on the political and economic state
of foreign governments, based on data received from special, restricted
sources;
6. Matters of staff and persons working abroad per the line of special
Departments;
7. Preparation and fulfillment of secret expeditions and correspondence on
them;
8. Correspondence on matters of the arrest and deportation of foreigners
and on the exchange of those arrested;
9. The organization of illegal border crossings;
10. Correspondence on investigative matters per articles 58-67 and 71 of the
Criminal Code.
C. Secret.
1. Correspondence on matters of administrative deportation and exile;
2. Escaped prisoners and disorders in places of confinement, and hunger
strikes 
 
(golodovki);
 
3. Correspondence on investigative matters not designated in point [III-B] 10
above, divulgence of which could damage the course of the investigation;
4. Acts and correspondence on putting into execution death sentences;
5. Correspondence on the conduct of arrests and searches, with the
exception of conduct in matters not requiring the observance of secrecy;
6. Preparation for the conclusion and emendation of non-secret political
treaties and agreements with foreign governments;
7. Information on preparation on the part of neighboring governments for
border conflicts and disturbances in the border zone;
8. Correspondence on change in the principles of state policy connected
with  emigration in general and with matters of restoration of citizenship
 
(grazhdanstvo)
 
 in particular;
9. Data on persons prohibited from entering the USSR;
10. Correspondence on the issue of visas in special order.
D. Restricted.
1. Information on conflicts and disturbances among workers and other
strata of the population, not incorporated in information summaries;
2. White-Guardist and foreign literature (books, newspapers, etc.), whose
open sale in the USSR is not permitted.
IV. [Material of] a general nature. 
A. Top secret.
1. State codes; coded and decoded correspondence; correspondence on
codes and on cryptographic work.
B. Secret.
1. The organization of secret document handling 
 
(deloproizvodstvo);
 
procedure for conducting and archiving secret correspondence;
2. [Anything] pertaining to correspondence received from other
Departments as secret, when the issue in [the correspondence] that is
under discussion has been brought up by [an organization] other than the
receiving Department and does not belong in full to [the latters]
jurisdiction.
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C. Restricted.
1. Characterizations and attestation materials on personnel (In the Military
Department  secret.)
2. Materials on inspection and revision, not containing information
enumerated in the present list as secret.
Source: GAKhK, f. r-1228, op. 1, d. 56, ll. 70-72: 
 
[From:] Head of the OGPU
Special Section (Nachspetsotdela) Bokii, Head of the 5th Section of the
OGPU Special Section Tsibizov,
 
 copy, not signed, no date, from context
probably May/June 1927.
In practice the above list applied to both Party and state channels. Moreover, it
governed not just correspondence in the grammatological sense but communication
in general (including electronically transmitted information). However, it
contained several noticeable omissions. Operational information and orders within
the military proper continued to be governed by an idiosyncratic right-to-know
regime that remains obscure. Much OGPU, NKVD, and Narodnyi Komissariat
Iustitsii 
 
(Narkomiust)
 
 material not specified in the list also seems to have been
classified on principle. No doubt there were other important lacunae.
 
9
 
Note too that classification terms differing from those specified above were
quite common. Most of these right-to-know indicators amounted to variations on
established themes. Thus strictly secret (
 
strogo sekretno
 
) was equivalent
functionally to top secret (
 
sovershenno sekretno
 
). The addition of the word
urgent (
 
srochno
 
) to a given classification indicated pressing temporality rather
than any change in intrinsic status. Regarding the common addition personal
(
 
lichno
 
), it was a need-to-know, information-targeting designation and did not
affect right-to-know status.
Only in the case of not for publication (
 
ne pechataetsia
 
 and its equivalents)
does there seem to have been independent meaning. This term normally seems to
have fallen somewhere between unclassified and restricted (
 
ne podlezhashchii
oglasheniiu
 
 and its equivalents). Apparently it was used most often to distinguish
knowledge potentially available to the public from information meant to be
circulated only within the 
 
apparat
 
 but not otherwise restricted.
 
10
 
9. Classified topics omitted from the list would appear to include: trial proceedings and
judicial-system reviews; penal administration; fines and other civil (as opposed to criminal)
sanctions; censorship and propaganda; earthquakes, famines, forest fires, floods, and other civil
disasters; major epidemics among both the human (plague, typhus, cholera) and farm-animal
(glanders, anthrax, infectious anemia) populations; municipalizations and nationalizations;
some election-related proceedings including the compilation of voter lists, vote-counting, and
recounts; the fixing of tax rates, surcharges, rents and user fees; etc. 
10. See for example GAKhK, f. r-137 (Dalkraiispolkom), op. 3, d. 47 (
 
Sbornik postanovlenii i
rasporiazhenii Dalkraiispolkoma za 1931 god
 
), ll. 421-512: 
 
Sistematicheskii ukazatel
postanovlenii D[alnego] V[ostochnogo] K[raevogo] I[spolnitelnogo] K[omiteta] za 1931
god.
 
 Most of these open-session resolutions are printed in full in accordance with routine
procedure. However No. 1067 (25.IX.31 g.), 1281 (12.XI.31 g.), and No. 1333 (28.XI.33 g.)
are marked 
 
ne pechataetsia
 
 while No. 481 (15.V.31 g.), No. 528 (10.VI.31 g.), and three others
are designated 
 
ne podlezhit oglasheniiu
 
.
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As for what was meant in Section III-A by conspiratorial information, the term
originated within the pre-revolutionary Party. It initially had to do with knowledge
circulated only within the core group of Bolshevik activists. These elitist
connotations were strengthened after the Civil War, when the Party began to
grapple with expansion for purposes of peacetime administration.
 
11
 
 Following the
right-to-know reforms of the early 1920s, information was deemed conspiratorial
for one of two related reasons.
First, certain top-level, central bodies were designated conspiratorial organs.
All their bureaucratic paper was classified at least 
 
sovershenno sekretno
 
 and its
handling was made subject to special need-to-know regulations (q.v.). On the Party
side of things, the major conspiratorial organs in the 1920s and 1930s were headed
by the 
 
Politbiuro
 
. Reporting directly to it were the Organizatsionnoe biuro TsK
VKP(b) (
 
Orgbiuro
 
), the Sekretariat TsK VKP(b) (Sekretariat), the Prezidium
Tsentralnogo Kontrolnogo Komiteta VKP(b) (Prezidium TsKK, later the Biuro
Partiinogo Kontrolnogo Komiteta VKP(b)), and the Ispolnitelnyi Komitet
Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala (IKKI). Leaving aside the institutionalized
military, which evidently followed its own idiosyncratic right-to-know system, the
conspiratorial state organs notably included the Cheka
 
/
 
GPU/OGPU/post-1934
NKVD
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 and 
 
Narkomindel
 
. Both of these nominally were subservient to SNK
SSSR and practically appended directly to the 
 
Politbiuro.
 
Second, certain highly charged topics were assigned conspiratorial status.
Information pertaining to them normally bore a minimum classification of 
 
sekretno
 
and was subject to the aforementioned special regulations regardless of venue.
Precisely what the conspiratorial topics were is unclear and no definitive taxonomy
has turned up. However, they almost certainly corresponded closely to a group of
 
Politbiuro
 
-agenda items assigned so-called special folder (
 
osobaia papka
 
) status.
As suggested above, from roughly 1920 on information connected directly to
 
Politbiuro 
 
sessions (protocols and attendant documents, including attachments,
resolutions, excerpts, submissions by subcommissions and working groups,
circulars, etc.) automatically carried a minimum classification of 
 
sovershenno
sekretno
 
.
 
13
 
 However, certain 
 
Politbiuro
 
-protocol items were even more restricted.
These carried the designation 
 
osobaia papka
 
 (literally, special folder).
 
14
 
 They
 
11. For 
 
konspirizatsiia
 
 and its consequences see e.g. Andrea Graziosi, 
 
The great Soviet peasant
war: Bolsheviks and peasants, 1917-1933
 
, Harvard papers in Ukrainian studies (Cambridge:
Ukrainian Research Institute, 1996).
12. This requires qualification. In addition to its politicized police-organ responsibilities, the
post-1934 NKVD dealt with such mundane internal-affairs matters as civil-sector fire
protection. These unexceptional functions do not seem to have been considered conspiratorial.
13. On the automatic classification see O. V. Khlevniuk, A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L.
A. Rogovaia, eds, 
 
Stalinskoe Politbiuro v 30-e gody: Sbornik dokumentov
 
 (Moscow: Airo-
XX, 1995): 9 (hereafter 
 
Stalinskoe Politbiuro
 
). 
 
Politbiuro
 
 protocols for the 1920s and 1930s
are archived in RTsKhIDNI, f. 17 (TsK VKP(b)), op. 3.
14. 
 
Politbiuro
 
-protocol points classified 
 
osobaia papka
 
 and some of their attendant papers are
archived in RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 162. To the best of my knowledge, these 
 
osobye papki
 
 now
are generally accessible to researchers only through the mid-1930s.
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included at a minimum: police-organ matters; 
 
Narkomindel
 
, IKKI, and other issues
with international-relations implications; defense (this was interpreted broadly);
hard-currency questions including import and export plans; and top-level intra-
Party business.
 
15
 
 That is, they were more or less the main administrative concerns
of the various conspiratorial organs reporting to the 
 
Politbiuro
 
.
 
16
 
While 
 
osobaia papka
 
 was the highest right-to-know classification known to me
to have been employed in the 1920s and 1930s, its use was extremely narrow. It
normally applied only to decisions taken in agenda order by the 
 
Politbiuro
 
 and
circulated for informational purposes within that organ.
The 
 
Politbiuro publicly, if not privately, was an advisory body issuing no direct
orders and having no direct role in governance. Thus osobaia papka decisions (like all
its directives) had to be laundered through proxy organs. In general these were the
TsK VKP(b) for Party matters plus SNK SSSR and/or STO for state business.
Osobaia papka-level decisions normally bore only the Politbiuros routine
sovershenno sekretno classification as they percolated through apparat pipelines. So
too did input and follow-up handled by the various subsidiary groups charged with
managing such matters.17 However, the Politbiuro occasionally forewent the fiction
of asking proxies to promulgate osobaia papka-level directives. For matters of
sufficient urgency and/or gravity it simply issued them itself in the name of the proxy
15. See RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 112: Protokol No. 22 zasedaniia PB TsK VKP(b) ot
7.I.1931 g. (osobyi No. ----). Punkt 17/27 (reshenie ot 30.XII.30 g.). O zasedaniiakh Politbiuro
(t. Stalin). This marked a short-lived attempt to separate the Politbiuros normal business (if the
term may be used) from osobaia papka agenda items. Stalins proposal was to discuss the
former at sessions on the 5th, 10th, and 15th of the month while restricting sessions on the 10th,
20th, and 30th to the latter.
16. Not all osobaia papka items were intrinsically momentous, and the classification sometimes
was awarded primarily for procedural reasons. A strikingly banal example is RTsKhIDNI, f. 17,
op. 162, d. 12, l. 170: Protokol No. 82 zasedaniia PB TsK VKP(b) ot 8 ianvaria 1932 g. (osobyi
No. ----). Punkt 42/2. O myle (tt. Molotov, Mikoian). This mandated the release from reserve
stocks of seven thousand tons of household soap to cover undershipment to Leningrad, Moscow,
the Donbass, and other sensitive areas where workers were complaining of goods shortages.
17. The Politbiuro began life in 1919 as a permanent subcommittee of the TsK RKP(b), later
the TsK VKP(b). TsK VKP(b) chancellery work devolved in general on its Secretariat, and
responsibility for classified information on the Secretariats Biuro. Thus the Biuros functions
included handling Politbiuro paper.
On 19 March 1926, the Biuros responsibility for classified information was transferred to a
so-called Sekretnyi Otdel (SO) newly formed within the Secretariat. The SO consisted of a
number of subsections assigned to the various permanent TsK VKP(b) subdivisions. They were
called (unimaginatively) the Politbiuro apparat, the Orgbiuro apparat, etc.
On or around 10 May 1929, the SO was reorganized into seven sectors (sektory). Sector 1
served the three TsK secretaries and their apparaty; Sector 2 served the Secretariat TsK VKP(b)
and the Politbiuro; Sector 3 handled documents for the Orgbiuro; Sector 4 dealt with codes and
ciphers; Sector 5 kept tabs on the return of conspiratorial documents; Sector 6 was the secret
TsK VKP(b) archive; and Sector 7 dealt with communications, stenography, autopen
(mashinopis) signatures, and so on.
The SO again was restructured on 13 November 1933. That part of Sector 2 serving the
Politbiuro was split off, usurping its parent organs name and made directly subordinate to
Stalin (the remainder was designated the Upravlenie delami TsK VKP(b)). Thus the title SO
TsK VKP(b) now referred to a dedicated Politbiuro chancellery handling classified information.
With the adoption of a new Party charter early in 1934, the revamped SO was renamed the
Osobyi Sektor. However it does not appear to have changed function. It continued to handle the
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organ. In such cases the copy of the decision that was seconded after the fact to the
nominal bureaucratic issuer(s) seems to have born osobaia papka status.18
Non-conspiratorial organs deliberating conspiratorial topics were required to do
so in so-called closed sessions (zakrytye zasedaniia). Statutorily, these were
meetings, plenums, conferences, etc., in which deliberation of the most secret
matters (naibolee sekretnye voprosy) was supposed to take place without
secretaries or report-givers and with the presiding individual responsible for
maintaining the session protocol.19 That is, physical presence at decisive moments
theoretically was restricted to individuals formally vested with decision-making
authority and, implicitly, appropriate security clearance.
Sessions that began in normal order could be declared temporarily closed in the
event a conspiratorial topic came up, whether accidentally or in agenda order.
18. Apart from the Politbiuro, STO circa 1931 was using the designation osobaia papka. See
e.g. GARF, f. 5674 [STO], op. 1, d. 46, l. 58: Protokol No. 22 zasedaniia Soveta Truda i
Oborony ot 16 avgusta 1931 g. O zakreplenii raionov dlia eksporta pshenitsa. This is marked
for decision, see special folder (reshenie sm[otrite] osobuiu papku).
So too was SNK SSSR circa 1937. See e.g. GARF, f. 5446 (SNK SSSR), op. 57?! [delo and
list not given]: sov[ershenno] sekretno (Osobaia papka). Postanovlenie No. 1428-326ss Soveta
Narodnykh Komissarov Soiuza SSR i Tsentralnogo Komiteta VKP(b). O vyselenii koreiskogo
naseleniia iz pogranichnykh raionov Dalnevostochnogo kraia. 21 avgusta 1937 goda. [over:]
Predsedatel Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov Soiuza SSR V. Molotov, Sekretar Tsentralnogo
Komiteta VKP(b) I. Stalin, given in Mezhdunarodnaia konfederatsiia koreiskikh assotsiatsii
(SNG), Moskovskii mezhdunarodnyi universitet, Belaia kniga o deportatsii koreiskogo
naseleniia Rossii v 30-40kh godakh. Kniga pervaia, avtory-sostaviteli: Professor Li U Khe,
dotsent Kim En Un (Moscow: Interpraks, 1992): 64-65.
Both of these examples probably reflect osobaia papka resolutions directly issued by the
Politbiuro in the name of proxy organs. My educated guess is that Politbiuro provenance is
similarly true for all osobaia papka material that may be archived in STO, SNK SSSR, and
other top-level fondy.
19. See RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 740, ll. 13-15: Prilozhenie No. 2 k p[unktu] 17 pr[otokola]
No. 80 (zasedaniia Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) ot 16 maia 1929 g.). O Konspiratsii (utverzhdeno
Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) 16.V.1929 g.  Prilozhenie. Iz postanovleniia Politbiuro TsK ot
5.V.27 g. O polzovanii sekretnymi materialami, razdel B punkt 11, in Stalinskoe Politbiuro:
75-77. A full translation of this document excerpt appears on pages 17-19 of this article.
Politbiuros paperwork processing as well as some direct preparatory work and follow-up
investigation (proverka). All this was done at the sovershenno sekretno level of classification.
Meanwhile, the bulk of the Politbiuros preparatory work and proverka devolved on various
Politbiuro commissions. Some of these were more or less permanent, e.g. the hugely important
Komissiia Oborony (KO PB). Most however were more in the nature of temporary working
groups. As far as I know, none of the information channeled through any of these was classified
osobaia papka. Instead it appears to have been designated sovershenno sekretno.
Note however that on 14 April 1937 the Politbiuro consolidated the most pressing parts of this
input/follow-up work among two standing commissions. One, consisting of Stalin, V. M.
Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich, and N. I. Ezhov, was assigned to handle osobaia papka-type topics
including matters of foreign policy. It also received authority to decide matters in the name of the
Politbiuro in cases of special urgency. The other, consisting of Stalin, Molotov, V. Ia. Chubar,
A. I. Mikoian, and Kaganovich, was to deal with urgent administrative?! (khoziaistvennye)
matters. It is quite possible that at least the first of these commissions operated routinely at the
osobaia papka-level. Unfortunately, verification is impossible because the records evidently are
in the so-called Presidential Archive (Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii   APRF) and
thus are off limits to researchers. See RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 986, ll. 16-17: Protokol No. 48
zasedaniia PB TsK VKP(b) ot 16 aprelia 1937 g. Punkt 53 (oprosom chlenov PB ot 14.IV.37 g.).
O podgotovke voprosov dlia Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), given in Stalinskoe Politbiuro: 55. 
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Common practice however was to segregate meeting agendas into parallel
deliberations. One set of these split sessions served for routine business and a
second, closed set took up conspiratorial topics.20 Note however that zakrytye
zasedaniia not infrequently also considered non-conspiratorial topics. Moreover,
though closed-session protocols always were classified, input, output, and/or
follow-up to non-conspiratorial agenda points from them often bore no direct
indication of special provenance. Typically it was indistinguishable from the
bureaucratic paper generated by routine sessions. One other aspect of the
Orientation List deserves additional explanation. According to section IV-B point
2, anything engendered by correspondence that some other organ had classified
sekretno was supposed to retain that classification unless the recipient had both full
jurisdiction over the matter and some reason to alter it. In practice, the principle
underlying this prescription had something approaching Newtonian universality. I
call it the Law of the Conservation of Classification: outgoing information
routinely went up (or across) channels at whatever the level of secrecy a direct
request for it had borne coming in. This happened whether or not anything in the
information itself warranted even minimal classification.21 
Sovietologists who care about such things have been struck for some time by the
apparent overclassification of so many Stalin-revolution documents. Some of this
no doubt occurred because paper-processing functionaries and other apparatchiki
20. Closed sessions often were identified explicitly, as for example (from the Smolensk
Archive) VKP-44/21-22: sekretno. Protokol No. 48 zakrytogo ob"edinennogo zasedaniia
Biuro Kaluzhskogo Gubkoma VKP(b) i Prezidiuma GKK ot 6-go ianvaria 1929 g. However,
they could be less obviously labeled. The closed convenings of STO SSSR are a notable
example. These were known as Managing Sessions (rasporiaditelnye zasedanii; RZ STO)
through 23 December 1930, when the Komissiia Oborony pri PB (Stalin, Molotov, K. E.
Voroshilov, V. V. Kuibyshev, and G. K. Ordzhonikidze, with L. M. Kaganovich at first a de
facto and later a de jure member) took over their function and began direct issue of
conspiratorial-topic orders in the name of STO. This fiction was maintained until 27 April
1937, when STO was abolished altogether and the KO PB restructured as the Komitet
Oborony pri SNK SSSR (also KO). 
21. Here is a typical example from GARF, f. 5515 (Narodnyi Komissariat Truda SSSR;
NKTrud), op. 33s (Sekretariat Kollegiia NKTrud  sekretnaia chast), d. 53:
A) The seminal request was l. 7: sekretno. srochno. Narkomtiazhprom [NKTP] SSSR t.
Stoliarovu. [from:] Zam[estitel] Nachalnika Upravleniia Kadrov NKT SSSR Kozlov,
Inspektor Gomovich. Narodnyi komissariat truda Soiuza SSR No. 17s, 5 ianvaria 1933 g. This
asked NKTP SSSR for data from some of its subsidiary trust organs in Dalnevostochnyi krai:
Aviastroi (a hydroplane-assembly plant under construction at Komsomolsk-na-Amure),
Soiuzvodostroi (a dam and water-supply reservoir for Vladivostok), Ogneuportsemstroi (a
Portland-cement kiln at Spassk, on the Ussurii River between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok),
etc. It sought data on expenses on recruitment and in-transfer of workers for 1932, outlay
targets for 1933, the state of recruitment agreements with kolkhozy and edinolichniki, material
conditions at the job sites, etc. There is nothing in the otherwise mundane document (or for that
matter, the entire delo) to indicate it, but all these projects had crash-priority defense
significance ratified by Stalin himself. This hidden military angle apparently supplied the
original rationale for classification (presumably under I-B-11 in the 1927 Orientation List).
B) NKTP ordered the Moscow representations of the trusts in question to respond directly to
NKTrud as well as to it. The directive went out five days later as l. 18: srochno-sekretno.
Pochto-telegramma No. 458s iz Tsentr[alnogo] Sektora Truda NKTP SSSR. [from:]
Nachalnik Tsentralnogo Sektora Truda NKTP SSSR Figatner. 10.I.33 g. [copy archived by
NKTrud as:] No. 285.
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found it prudent, in a climate of increasingly rampant paranoia, to err on the side of
caution. As Sheila Fitzpatrick once suggested, it also may have been an expedient
way of flagging important items in an accelerating paper avalanche.22 Regardless of
how much these factors may have come into play, however, the Orientation List
plus the Law of Conservation of Classification seem to have been the methods
behind much of the apparent madness. I concede that the apparat was no better at
carrying out proper document-handling procedure (deloproizvodstvo) in the late
1920s and 1930s than at fulfilling anything else in due order. Still, I contend that
secrecy stamps were applied far more rationally than previously supposed.
General implications of right-to-know controls
The right-to-know controls outlined above have a number of broad sovietological
implications. For one thing, certain military and secret-police matters apparently
warranted a higher level of classification (sovershenno sekretno) than anything of a
financial/economic nature. On the presumption that secrecy level corresponded to
general epistemological importance, this strikes me as an interesting commentary
on Stalinist priorities: the USSRs economic transformation evidently had less
importance than the defense of the Revolution against notional enemies, whether
foreign or domestic. The List can be read as a kind of demonological guide to
Bolshevik bogeys, sometimes yielding surprising, counter-intuitive results. Thus
counterfeiting (II-A-22, rated sekretno) apparently was a more serious specter by
the late 1920s than White Guardist literature (III-D-2; ne podlezhashchii
oglasheniiu), and so on.
Moreover, the Orientation List shows not only the range of information kept
secret in the late 1920s and 1930s but also (by implication) the revelatory limits of
non-secret paper from those years. It provides us some quite solid guidelines to the
sorts of considerations differentiating the hidden side of the emerging Stalinist
system from its public facade. Knowing approximately where previously available
evidential knowledge leaves off and having a well-grounded topical sense of what
we are likely to encounter in still-unexplored secret files should contribute
enormously to our future research.
22. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, Introduction: Sources on the social history of the 1930s. Overview
and critique, in Sheila Fitzpatrick, Lynne Viola, eds, A researchers guide to sources on Soviet
social history in the 1930s (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1989): 3-25, here 5.
C) The responses from the trusts maintained NKTruds original classification of sekretno but
were wholly banal in content. See for example l. 20: srochno-sekretno. [to:] NKTP Tsentralnyi
Sektor Truda/kopiia NKT[ruda]-SSSR. [from:] SSSR NKTP Soiuzvodostroi sekretnaia chast
[in response to:] NKTruda No. 16/s [received via NKTP on:] 25.I.33. Anyone encountering the
body of this message out of context might wonder why it had ever been classified. All it said
was that the reservoir project was planning to bring in workers by passenger train at average
cost of 363 rubles a head, including a 50-ruble wage advance for household startup, and would
pay them at a rate 1.2 times that of the all-Union norm.
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Special handling procedures
The right-to-know regime outlined above was a set of restrictions designed to limit
the number of persons potentially privy to certain knowledge. To help preserve this
secrecy, the preparation, physical distribution, and storage of classified information
were governed by measures I call special handling procedures. These were codified
preliminarily in 1927 by the OGPU in conjunction with work on the right-to-know
controls issued as the Orientation List. Ratified by the Politbiuro, they formed the
basis for the special regulations for conspiratorial material specified in section IV-
B point 2. Here in translation are the relevant sections of the resolution in question:
Proceeding from the past-proven principle that secret matters should be
known only by those who absolutely have to know them, with the aim of
securing maximum conspiracy in [our] dealings and in the use of secret
materials, it is considered necessary: 
[...]
B. With regard to the circulation of conspiratorial documents.
1. Only comrades to whom they are addressed may acquaint themselves
with excerpts from Politbiuro protocols (a single institution may be sent
only a single excerpt, with an indication of all addressees located in the
given institution).
2. The period for returning Politbiuro and Central Committee Presidium
protocols is established at no more than 3 days after the day of receipt.
3. Excerpts from Politbiuro protocols are subject to return no later than
within a 7-day period. Excerpts from osobye papki are subject to return
within 24 hours.
Note: Narkomindel, Voenved, OGPU, and IKKI are permitted retention
of materials for a more prolonged period, on the personal responsibility
of the head of the institution.
4. To reiterate, especially secret documents should be circulated not to the
address of the institution, but personally (with the inscription “personal
only” (tol’ko lichno) on the envelope). 
5. Identical directives directed to institutions at a [single] location are sent
only to one address.
6. The obligatory numbering of copies of circulated materials is reiterated.
7. Coded messages and materials of the Politbiuro with the inscription
“personal” (lichno) shall be opened only by the addressee.
Note: comrade Tovstukha23 is directed to regularize the technique for
delivery of materials.
8. The heads of institutions are obliged to organize especially strict and
careful control over the timely return and destruction of circulated
conspiratorial materials.
9. It is established as a rule that materials for sessions of inter-Departmental
and other commissions considering secret matters shall be circulated
23. I. P. Tovstukha, formerly an assistant to the director of the Institut V. I. Lenin in Moscow,
from 1926 to 1930 head of the Secret Section (Sekretnyi Otdel) of the Central Committee
Secretariat, later deputy director of the Institute of Marks-Engels-Lenin in 1930 and 1931 (i.e.,
assigned to Party archival work), died 1935.
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only to those members of the commission who should know the matter in
full. The representatives of various Departments and institutions shall be
circulated only that part of the materials directly concerning them.
10. The return to the commission Chair of secret materials circulated per
commission agenda, promptly after making a decision on the relevant
matter, is established.
11. All institutions, and equally all commissions, are required to consider the
most secret matters in closed sessions without secretaries and report-
givers, with the protocol kept by the presiding individual.
12. It is considered necessary to keep to a minimum the quantity of
circulating informational material, and to circulate to comrades only
what is necessary for them for work.
[...]
C. Regarding the storage, circulation, and sending of conspiratorial materials.
1. The rule [against] keeping conspiratorial documents in lodgings and in
institutions is reiterated.
2. The rule forbidding the sending and transit of secret documents of the
Central Committee, OGPU, [Narkomindel], and IKKI except via
diplomatic pouch or OGPU courier service24 is reiterated. 
Note: Exceptions to this rule can be made by decision of the Central
Committee Secretariat.
3. Keeping secret materials of the Central Committee, OGPU,
[Narkomindel], and IKKI in personal archives is categorically forbidden.
The Secret Section of the Central Committee is obliged to demand,
within a period of two months, secret Central Committee materials from
all comrades having them.25 
[...]
F. On officials carrying out secret work.
As for crimes regarding secret matters, all institutional and
organizational officials carrying out secret work are liable for judgment
in extra-judicial order.
G. On procedure for realizing the present measures.
1. All institution heads are obliged to carry out all of the aforementioned
measures in a timely manner. Hereafter, careful attention is to be given
to procedure for the storage, for the circulation, and for control over the
return and use of conspiratorial documents.
2. The OGPU (comrade Bokii)26 is instructed to monitor the correct use of
codes by institutions and individuals having them.
24. The Feldegerskii Korpus OGPU. This armed-courier service evolved out of the Tsarist
Armys dispatch unit, which bore the name from 1796 to 1917, and then the Red Armys
version of the same. In the post-Civil War Soviet state, it was administratively a division of the
GPU/OGPU/post-1934 NKVD; apparently it was supposed to revert from quasi-civilian to full
military status in the event of war.
25. As was the case with most (if not all) attempts to impose administrative discipline on top
Party personages, this rule was not always respected in practice.
26. G. I. Bokii, born 1879, Party member from 1900, OGPU Collegium member from 1923,
repressed 1937.
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3. Control over the realization of the aforementioned decisions is laid on
the OGPU (comrade Bokii), ordering it in 1.5 months to present to the
Politbiuro a report on the realization of the present resolution.
4. The Central Control Commission is requested to carry out a decisive
struggle with comrades who are disseminating secret decisions, and with
every sort of rumor, gossip, etc. of a political nature.
Source: RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 740, ll. 13-15: Prilozhenie No. 2 k p. 17
pr. PB No. 80 (zasedaniia Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) ot 16 maia 1929 g.). O
Konspiratsii (utverzhdeno Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) 16.V.1929 g. 
Prilozhenie. Iz postanovleniia Politbiuro TsK ot 5.V.27 g. O polzovanii
sekretnymi materialami.27 
These prescriptions were amplified in 1929 as part of a campaign to isolate
notional Right Oppositionists. They evidently remained in effect until information
handling was put on a wartime footing in the early 1940s.28 In the meantime, a
number of the principles originally applying to conspiratorial information were
applied by extension to the handling of non-conspiratorial secret information. The
whole business was knotty, even by the perverse standards of the 1930s.
Disentangling all of its myriad strands will require extensive additional research for
which I have neither time nor money nor (at present) a burning desire. However, I
would like to elaborate on a few commonalties bearing on archival holdings.
To begin with, Stalinist bureaucratic entities as a rule either had some equivalent
of a subordinate chancellery section assigned to information services or else shared
such a secretariat. Many of these bodies never dealt in routine order with classified
materials. However, those regularly working with secret as well as non-secret
information contained individuals or subsections specially cleared for the level of
classified material expected to come their way.29 In cases where the amount and/or
classification level of secret information was great (e.g. for the conspiratorial
organs), the entire chancellery might have had special clearance.30
27. Translated from the Russian version in Stalinskoe Politbiuro: 75-77.
28. For the amplification see Prilozhenie No. 2 k p[unktu] 17 pr[otokola] PB No. 80. O
Konspiratsii (Utverzhdeno Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) 16.V.1929 g.) in Stalinskoe Politbiuro: 75.
This came out of an explicitly anti-oppositionist resolution of the April 1929 joint TsK/TsKK
plenum. The decree mandated special measures [...] which exclude the possibility that
Trotskiists may be informed about Central Committee and Politbiuro affairs (ibid.: 77). The
major change from the 1927 procedures was the elimination of so-called 2nd-category proxies
(q.v.). The decree also ordered the reverification of clerical workers processing material at this
level (1st category proxies and SO TsK VKP(b) workers).
29. By way of illustration, the Kollegiia NKTruda SSSR handled both classified and non-
classified documents. Within it was a Sekretnaia chast responsible for the classified
paperwork. See GARF, f. 5515, op. 33s.
30. For example, the Dalkraiispolkoms permanent Representation in Moscow
(Predstavitelstvo Dalkraiispolkoma pri VTsIKe-Moskva) functioned mainly as a clearing
house for Kremlin-level, state-sector material sent to and from the Far East. All of this
information was classified sekretno or higher. Thus the Representations chancellery lacked a
separate secret section. See the explanatory notes to GAKhK, f. r-1228, op. 1.
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Special clearance for chancellery workers originally was divided into two broad
categories. One group consisted of members of the SO Secretariat TsK VKP(b) and
its successors, plus so-called first-category proxies (doverennye po 1-i kategorii).
These last were essentially secretary-deputies serving under conspiratorial-organ
members and candidate members. This group of people had the right to receive,
unseal, and process conspiratorial-status documents. A much larger group of so-
called second-category proxies (doverennye po 2-i kategorii), evidently
secretaries scattered through the apparat, functioned in the 1920s as a kind of poste
restante service for conspiratorial-status paper. That is, it had the right to receive
and hold these documents but not the right to unseal or process them. Second-
category proxies however were eliminated in 1929-1930.
One important sovietological implication of the vetted chancellery/proxy
system stems from the fact that virtually all inner-circle Bolsheviks had multiple
administrative responsibilities. They thus had multiple possible addresses via
which they might send and receive highly classified paper. Ian Borisovich
Gamarnik, to take one example from my own research, was in the 1930s
simultaneously a member of the Orgbiuro, a Central Committee member, Stalins
personal plenipotentiary in Dalnevostochnyi krai, Voroshilovs deputy in
Narkomvoenmor, deputy chair of Revvoensovet SSSR (until 1934), head of the
Red Army Political Administration (Politupravlenie RKKA), and a member of any
number of temporary inter-organizational commissions dealing with military-
preparedness topics. Since Gamarnik operated on the principle that the chancellery
at hand was the chancellery to use, conspiratorial correspondence to/from him
(including telegrams to/from Stalin) is here, there, and everywhere.
What is true for Gamarnik must be so also for Mikoian, Kaganovich,
Voroshilov, Andreev, Rudzutak, Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, et al. (though
not necessarily so for Stalin and perhaps Molotov). On the assumption that these
men probably did not save all communication with each other for Politbiuro and
Central Committee meetings, much high-level policy debate may in fact be out
there, waiting to be pieced together from perhaps dozens of disparate sources.
Finally, special handling procedures also were used to preserve secrecy while
classified information was in transit. Soviet secrets circulated via three basic
methods. First, as mentioned above, hard copies of conspiratorial documents
circulated domestically in sealed packets carried by special couriers from the so-
called Adjutant Corps (Feldegerskii Korpus). These armed messengers had special
clearance to handle such material but were strictly forbidden to unseal the packets
and examine their contents. Second, indirect electronic transmissions (telegrams,
cables, radiograms, and the telephone-delivered text messages known as
telefonogramy) were supposed to be handled by specially vetted operators.31 Third,
31. This could present problems when messages required retransmission due to distance.
Relay stations needed to know in advance that highly classified material was coming through
to ensure that the proper dispatchers would be on duty. For example: Gamarnik was in
Dalnevostochnyi krai early in 1932 during one of his stints as Stalin-appointed head of a task
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direct voice-link discussion of classified topics was supposed to be made only over
secure telephone lines or frequencies.
The third of these methods of transmitting classified information is somewhat
problematic sovietologically. As Dmitrii Volkogonov showed in Triumf i tragediia.
Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina v 2-kh knigakh (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Agenstva
pechati Novosti, 1989), particularly in vol. II, part 1, Stalin in his capacity as
wartime Generalissimo was an inveterate micromanager capable of wallowing in
minutiae and accounting for an enormous paper output. However it is at least
possible that Stalin orchestrated certain matters via face-to-face meetings, direct
telephone calls, and/or perhaps voice-radio connection. Orders and information
transmitted verbally being inherently ephemeral, no significant hard evidence may
ever have existed of his direct authorization for any given course of action.
Credible indirect evidence of 1930s reliance on voice-link connection between
the Kremlin inner circle (including Stalin) and anointed envoys in the field exists in
Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv (RGVA, f. 9 (Politupravlenie RKKA),
op. 29s, d. 145). This hugely revealing delo consists of several hundred coded
telegrams (shifrovki) dispatched to and from Ian Gamarnik during his three
separate stints in the Far East in 1932 and 1933 as Stalins personally appointed
plenipotentiary. The telegrams began when Gamarnik passed beyond Irkutsk on his
eastbound railway journeys and ended when he attained Irkutsk on his way back to
Moscow. This seems to have been because Lake Baikal marked the eastern limit of
secure-line telephone communication at the time.
Classified archival holdings
Classified documents not in transit were supposed to be kept under separate lock
and key within the bureaucratic offices using them. This enforced physical
segregation was supposed to be preserved to the extent possible when the records
eventually were archived. Mistakes happened and classified paper sometimes was
mingled into nominally non-secret holdings.32 However, although after-the-fact
32. GAPK, f. r-1518 (Kollektsiia dokumentov Dalkraiispolkoma), for example, contains
minimally indexed paper from the Dalkraiispolkom Presidium. It was the private document cache
of one t. Petrov, a member of the Prezidium DKIK during the 1930s and (prior to his 1938
execution) sometime head of the Primorskaia Oblispolkom. The fond has only one opis, all but
one of the dela in it unclassified. The majority of the documents in the unclassified dela are
mundane postanovleniia promulgated in normal working order. However, haphazardly
interpolated are a number of (thoroughly banal) resolutions marked restricted (ne podlezhit
oglasheniiu). I also found one resolution marked secret (sekretno) in the unclassified dela (it
dealt with the quite non-momentous topic of reducing motor-vehicle accidents). Evidently,
Primorskii krai archivists found the physical segregation after the fact of such scarcely momentous
force. On April 12, that year he telegramed V. V. Kuibyshev in Moscow on the catastrophic
status of the regions food supply. The lengthy message was coded and bore the designation top
secret (sovershenno sekretno). Archived along with the original, uncoded text is material on
how the encrypted message was sent to the Kremlin. This includes the names and ranks of the
OGPU telegraphists who sequentially passed on the missive. See RGVA, f. 9, op. 29s, d. 165,
ll. 117, 127-130.
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effort to find and correct filing errors sometimes was proportionate to the degree of
secrecy involved, Soviet-period archivists went to considerable lengths to effect
maximum segregation of classified records.
Classified material received by archives was segregated physically in two
principal ways. One method basically entailed storing it in discrete secret fondy, the
other separating it at the opis level and keeping it in compartmentalized, secret
sections of normal holdings.
Spetsfondy
Paper from conspiratorial organs and other bureaucratic entities whose entire
oeuvre was classified was archived in discrete, secret groupings I call spetsfondy.
Note that bureaucratic entity could mean one or more wholly secret subsections
of a given organ, secret or otherwise, provided the amount of classified material
requiring storage was large enough or restricted enough to warrant segregation.33
Spetsfondy were assigned unique identification/ retrieval numbers not appearing in
reading-room card catalogs, putevoditeli, or other finding aids made available to
researchers.34 On occasion the spetsfond number could also carry a postscript
indicating special-handling status, often a lower-case Cyrillic s for sekretno.35
Spetsfondy publicly did not exist during the Soviet period. At many archives,
traces of this pretense unfortunately have persisted into the post-Soviet present.
Retrograde views on the right to know are holding back the compilation and
distribution of new finding aids listing formerly secret holdings. Continuing lack of
candor can make it hugely difficult even to figure out where a desired set of
classified records was reposited, let alone come up with fond numbers and other
retrieval koordinaty for an attempt to work with the documents.
33. Concrete examples of this are hard to find in regional archives I have worked in. I have run
across only one apparent exception. GAKhK, f. r-353 (Dalnevostochnaia kraevaia planovaia
komissiia, intermingled with post-1938 documents of the Planovaia komissiia Khabarovskogo
kraiispolkoma), op . 3s, d. 11, Perspektivnyi plan osvoeniia raiona vostochnoi chasti Baikalo-
Amurskoi Magistrali 1933 g., is listed in the opis as na sekretnoi khran. v r. 1903s.
Evidently there is a spetsfond which contains planning-commission materials requiring
segregation, perhaps from the so-called sektor oborony or from a subsection doing contract
work for the NKVD.
34. Some examples of spetsfondy: At GARF, f. 4042 is the Main Administration of Local
Places of Detention of the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR (Glavnoe
Upravlenie Mestami Zakliucheniia NKVD RSFSR); f. 9414 is the principal GULag/
Glavupravlenie Lagerei NKVD/MVD SSSR file, containing among other things records of the
organs Secretariat, etc. They were classified unitarily.
35. See for example Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv po Dalnem Vostoke,
RGIA-DV, f. 3625s (Upravlenie Baikalo-Amurskogo Ispravitelno-Trudovogo Lageria
NKVD-g. Svobodnyi).
information not worth the effort. During the Soviet period they controlled access to the
classified documents in the fond by the expedients of making browsing forbidden and strictly
enjoining researchers to look only at pre-approved listy.
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Those of us with infinite time, money, and patience can always obtain
introductions, hie themselves off to various archives, request consultations, and
inquire in person about their desiderata. However, even the best, most forthcoming
staff at a given archive may be genuinely clueless as far as spetsfond holdings
elsewhere and progress can be laborious. By way of personal example, I have put
nearly three years of intermittent effort into tracking down the spetsfondy for the
OGPU/KGB Border Forces during the 1930s and have yet to see a document. My
quest has involved both trying to figure out whether the records are in the
notoriously user-unfriendly Tsentralnyi Arkhiv Ministerstva Bezopasnosti
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (TsAMBRF)  they arent  and hunting in alternative
locations.
The difficulties of tracking down spetsfondy are compounded by the ongoing
sequestration of material in APRF, a process that for us sovietologists resembles
watching black holes engulf the known universe. Worse, it turns out that bungling,
space considerations, wartime evacuations, and other factors may have dispersed
spetsfondy among non-Presidential archives that theoretically should not have
them. For example, while looking for the 1930s Border Forces files I inadvertently
uncovered the occupation-force records for post-WW II East Germany. They are
commingled with the WW II records of the Belorussian and Ukrainian-front
SMERSH counterintelligence-unit documents in RGVA, f. 32975 (untitled), op. 1s
(Upravlenie vnutrennikh voisk MGD v Germanii ianvaria 1947-marta 1953/MVD
maia 1946-ianvaria 1947). Apart from anything else, one reason no one seems to
have worked with either of the latter sub-collections is that RGVA is supposed to
contain no post-1941 material.
Moreover, my experience has been that even when one is morally certain a given
archive must hold a particular spetsfond it may be difficult to prove it in practice.
Almost always there is the catch-22 of classified material to overcome: you
frequently have to know whats available to be able to order it but you have to order
it to find out whats available. When consultations with staff at your target archive
come up empty there is no way to tell whether denials that material is present are
disingenuous or real.
I should add that the stratagem of requesting opisi for fondy whose numbers are
missing from finding-aid sequences doesnt work well. For one thing, obvious
trolling expeditions for spetsfondy and other classified dirt may annoy archivists.
Second, it appears that most lacunae in fond lists are real and have resulted from the
loss, merger, transfer, etc. of documents over the years.36 Moreover, those gaps that
36. For example, RGAE reportedly houses 1,945 fondy of all types, including spetsfondy,
personal document collections (lichnye fondy), partially classified fondy, and unclassified
fondy. The 1994 guide to the archive lists unclassified fondy, 1,574 of them. However, GARFs
fond number sequence runs from 2 up to at least 9,603. Thus there are many lacunae, such as the
641-number gap between f. 921 (Melnichnyi otdel Narkomvnutorga SSSR i ego
likvidatsionnaia komissiia) and f. 1562 (Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete
Ministrov SSSR). Most of these evidently resulted from bureaucratic reorganizations and
consequent internal shifting of files. Soviet archives did not recycle numbers that had once been
assigned; new fondy or fondy formed out of existing fondy were assigned new numbers at the tail
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are only apparent often turn out to designate odd-lot bits of banal paper that
archivists havent had the time or the inclination to deal with.37
Spetspodfondy
What I call spetspodfondy were created from the classified portion of documents
archived by bureaucratic entities processing both secret and non-secret paper.38
These were assigned the same basic fond number as the corresponding non-classified
paper, with a postscript often added to indicate special storage and handling status.
This postscript typically was a lower-case Cyrillic sch for sekretnaia chast.39
Whereas spetsfondy were hidden altogether from public view, it is important to
remember that spetspodfondy were merely the classified opisi from fondy normally
appearing in finding aids. Some of the most important central spetspodfondy from
the 1920s and 1930s evidently have been sequestered in APRF and now may be
wholly separated from their non-classified parent holdings.40 However, my
impression is that most of this type of classified paper remains physically in the same
37. Archivists refer to such odd-lot collections with a variety of idiosyncratic terms. I have
found that neannotirovannye fondy usually gets the point across.
Depending on the archive in question, published and/or reading-room putevoditeli may or may
not contain even partial lists of these odd-lot fondy. For a random published example of a Soviet-
era one that does, see Arkhivnyi Otdel UVD Tomskogo Oblispolkoma/Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv
Tomskoi Oblasti, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Tomskoi Oblasti: Putevoditel (Tomsk, 1960): 227-
243. These pages are a compilation entitled Spisok fondov, khraniashchikhsia v
gosudarstvennom arkhive Tomskoi oblasti, ne vkliuchennykh v osnovnuiu chast putevoditelia.
38. The term spetspodfond is my own shorthand and may not be understood without
explanation by Russians. In conversations with archivists I have found that podrazdeleniia
fondov podlezhashchie spetskhraneniiu gets the idea across.
39. Thus RGIA-DV, f. r-2413 (Dalkraiispolkom) is non-classified paper while f. r-2413sch
(Dalkraiispolkom  sekretnaia chast) is corresponding classified material.
40. Examples notably appear to include the classified material of the Sovet Trudy i Oborony/STO,
which between 1917 and the tail end of the 1930s was intermittently an enormously important
organ. During the Civil War period, STO as chaired by Lenin was an all-powerful emergency
council more or less running what passed for central Soviet government. From May 1920 into early
1924 its publicly acknowledged responsibilities were thoroughly banal (weights and measures,
inter-organizational financial arbitrage, etc.), and its influence over matters military was much
diminished. Throughout the rest of the 1920s it was probably the crucial organ as far as economic
policy, a good deal of which was connected intimately to non-operational defense considerations.
STO and the much better-known Sovnarkom SSSR shared roughly co-equal administrative status
in the post-Lenin 1920s. From 1926 to 1930 they also shared Rykov as chair, with their respective
deputy chairs on occasion meeting as a joint body. Sovnarkom SSSR was constitutionally the highest
organ of Soviet (State) power with STO technically subordinate to it. The distinction was ignored in
practice, unless STO in setting up a bureaucratic organ or commission needed the legal fiction of
Sovnarkom approval, and STO had functional autonomy. Both bodies institutionalized Politbiuro
and other TsK VKP(b) directives and also initiated their own work.
end of a given archives sequence. See State Archival Service of the Russian Federation, Russian
State Archive of the Economy/Gosudarstvennaia arkhivnaia sluzhba Rossiiskoi federatsii, Rossiiskii
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki, A research guide. 1: Guide to collections/ Putevoditel. 1:
Kratkii spravochnik fondov, American eds. William Chase and Jeffrey Burds, Russian eds. S. V.
Prasolova, A. K. Sokolov, E. A. Tiurina (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Blagovest, 1994). 
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archive as its parent fond, particularly at the regional and sub-regional levels I have
worked at. Obviously, this enormously simplifies the business of tracking it down.
Note that although the unclassified and spetspodfond portions of a partly classified
fond normally share the same archive, they may not share the same reading hall,
archivists, or access procedures. For example, at GARF and at Rossiiskii
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (RGAE), which cohabit the same group of
buildings in Moscow, most spetspodfondy belong administratively to the
spetskhranilishcha located on the upper floors of the complexs courtyard entrances.41 
The fundamental organizational unit of the spetspodfond was the classified
opis. Though the number of classified opisi theoretically could be large, my
impressions are that the total in practice tended to be small. As a rule, classified
opisi were numbered as part of the general sequence for their parent fond. They
routinely were differentiated by postscripts indicating special-handling status.
Normally this was a lower-case Cyrillic s for sekretno.
Classified opisi did not appear in Soviet-period putevoditeli, card catalogs, opis
lists, and other such finding aids made privy to individuals lacking security
clearance. With some exceptions, they still dont. This right-to-know legacy makes
it hard to divine whether or not they exist for a particular fond. The difficulty is not
helped by an atavistic tendency on the part of some archival staff to wait for
researchers to push the subject. This of course will vary greatly according to the
archive, the research agenda, the relative professional rank (and perhaps gender) of
the parties involved, prevailing political winds, and so on. Nevertheless, my
observation is that requests to see the opisi for any given fond unfortunately still
may result in delivery of a stack of unclassified folders.
University of Chicago
Department of History
1126 E. 59th St.
Chicago IL 60626
e-mail: jab3@midway.uchicago.edu
41. GARF, f. 5515, op. 33s (see footnote 1) is one exception and there may well be more. The
opis for some reason appears in the main reading-hall card catalog and is obtainable not from a
spetskhranilishche but via the main reading hall.
From July 1925 on, STOs so-called superintending or order-issuing sessions
(rasporiaditelnye zasedaniia STO) were essentially the governmental/administrative face of
the Komissiia Oborony pri Politbiuro TsK VKP(b). In April 1930 Stalin ousted Rykov from
power, personally taking control of the KO PB TsK VKP(b) and appointing V. I. Molotov STO
chair. As militarization increasingly dominated the Stalinist 1930s, so STOs already
considerable administrative importance grew.
Unclassified STO paper in GARF, f. 5674 runs through 1932 and is mainly mundane.
However, quite a few of the sanitized meeting records (protokoly) make fairly detailed passing
reference to top-secret agenda items whose full texts were not revealed on right-to-know
grounds. For example: op. 1, d. 19, l. 213 is Protokol STO No. 263 ot 23.VII.26 g. Listed as
punkt 35 is Ob izmennii st. 1 razdela 1 postan. STO ot 2.VII.25 g. ob OKHRANE
POGRANICHNOI POLOSY V VOENNOE VREMIA. d. No. st. 3-336 arkh. xix-4 utv.
24.VII.26 g. sov. sekretno. As of March 1996 the STO sub-fond was not available to me
through the GARF spetskhranilishcha and evidently has been transferred to APRF. 
